Virtually all economists would accept that economic conditions affect the health of banks. An FDIC research team has investigated whether this basic theory can be translated into a forecasting model, and specifically whether nonbank economic data can be used to improve forecasts of bank health. This project was a systematic effort to explore the somewhat surprising result noted by some of the developers of the Federal Reserve System's off-site program: regional economic variables do not improve the forecasts of bank health. 1 This paper reports on one aspect of that project: whether nonbank data can improve bank-failure forecasts.
2 In general, we find that economic data do not improve these forecasts despite the fact that the data are statistically significant. 3 Possible explanations for this result are explored in the conclusion.
This paper begins with a short description of the relationship between bank conditions and economic events in several regions in the United States. The second section describes both the bank-specific and the economic data used in this exercise. The third discusses bank-failure models in general before turning to whether economic data improve failure models. The conclusion speculates about the possible reasons that statelevel economic data do not improve the forecasts.
Bank Conditions and Economic Events
A casual examination of data from the past couple of decades might suggest that there is a very weak connection between the health of the economy and the health of the banking sector. Figure Consequently, almost all banks tended to draw all their deposits from their home states and to make the bulk of their loans in a very circumscribed area. The relevant economic conditions for most banks were local, not national.
Figures 2-5 are analogous to figure 1; however, they plot the growth of personal income for an individual state (solid line) against the percentage of banks that failed in that state (broken line). 4 Figures 2, 3, and 4 plot events in Texas, Massachusetts, and 4 These figures plot the number of failures as a percentage of the banks in existence in the state the previous December. The raw number of failures might be deceptive because Texas, for example, had many more banks than Massachusetts. These figures plot the growth rate of personal income in the state minus the growth rate of personal income in the United States. Rapid growth in the rest of the country probably tends to induce growth in all the states because the goods and services produced within a state are sold to customers in the rest of the country. Subtracting the two growth rates produces a positive number if the state is growing more rapidly than the rest of the United States, and a negative California-states that had notable banking crises. In contrast to figure 1, these seem to confirm the conventional wisdom that recessions cause banking failures. However, figure 5 plots events in Ohio, a state that had substantial economic problems but only a handful of bank failures.
5 Ohio is not unique in this regard. Apparently, banking crises tend to occur as a result of economic problems, but not all episodes of economic distress produce banking crises.
A closer examination of the figures does reveal a definite pattern. This pattern suggests that any model that uses state-level economic data to forecast bank failures should look back over a number of years and should be structured to allow for this sort of dynamic. The next section explains how this was done.
number if it is growing more slowly . This number is a better indicator of the intrinsic strength of a state's economy. Moreover, it yields a clearer relationship between local economic problems and banking problems. The Call Report and examination data are basically control variables. The variables of interest are the economic variables. The economic data were chosen with the criterion of whether they were likely to contribute to the accuracy of forecasts of failure among all FDIC-insured commercial banks. This criterion eliminated a number of data series.
The Data and the Model
Some data are simply not available on a timely basis. For example, Gross State Product (GSP) might be a better indicator of economic conditions than personal income.
7 See Hooks (1995) for a discussion of failure models. Demirgüc -Kunt (1989) has an overview of the earlier literature. 8 The effect of examination intervals on forecast accuracy was considered, however. The model had higher Type II and lower Type I errors for banks that had not been examined recently. A lower percentage of these banks failed. This finding contrasts with Cole and Gunther (1998) . Cole and Gunther find that, on average, a failure model has more difficulty forecasting the failure of banks that have not been examined recently. The key is that Cole and Gunther compare the whole power curves , whereas we are comparing a specific section of the power curves -the section that is associated with observations with specified probabilities of failure.
However, GSP data are available only with a lag of a couple of years, so 1998 data might be available only in 2000.
Second, the data must exist for times and locations in which there were a substantial number of bank failures. For example, even with the best data one could probably not estimate any sort of reasonable bank-failure model for the states of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. These five states had a total of 18 bank failures between 1980 and 1995, and there are simply not enough observations to estimate accurately any kind of model. Similarly, there was one bank failure in 1997 in the whole United States, so it is impossible to estimate any reasonable bank-failure model based solely on the data for that year.
Finally, other data are available for some regions but not for all. These data are potentially useful only for a subset of FDIC-insured banks; but this project had a broader focus. For example, a wide variety of series on local economic conditions are available only for a few states or cities. Forecasts of regional economic conditions might be a very useful indicator of the likelihood that banks in a region will fail in the future. Many firms produce those forecasts for some states or cities. However, the coverage of these forecasts is spotty, so their usefulness is limited.
Three broad categories of data meet the basic criterion: personal-income data, employment data, and banking aggregates.
9 Table 1 lists a number of these data series as "State Economic Variables" or "Alternative State Economic Variables." During the course of this project, each of these data series was tested. In general, the employment 9 All dollar-denominated numbers were deflated to 1992, though deflation makes no difference except in the specifications that pool the data for different periods.
data were the least useful, and growth in personal income and growth in total loans made by banks headquartered in a state improved the failure models the most.
In order to include the type of dynamic discussed above, we used five years' worth of data in the models. For example, if the growth rate in personal income was used, the model included five growth-rate terms-the rates from the year before the Call Report, from two years before it, and from three, four, and five years before it. Some experimentation revealed that using five years of data produced coefficients that were imprecisely estimated. The data are highly correlated, so the model cannot distinguish the effects of growth five years earlier from the effects of growth three years earlier. For that reason, most work used the growth rate of personal income between three and five years earlier, the growth rate two years earlier, and the previous year's growth rate.
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This approach produced more precise coefficient estimates and better forecasts.
Throughout this project, a logistic model was used. This is a standard model among both academics and bank regulators. 11 The model was fitted on bank failures that occurred within two years of the Call Report date, so the model can be said to have a two-year horizon.
After the model was fitted, out-of-sample forecasts were done. Because of the two-year horizon, the forecasts were based on data from the Call Report two years after the Call Report used to fit the model. For example, the model was fitted on failures in 1990 and 1991, Call Report data from December 1989, and the CAMEL rating for the 10 As in figures 2-5, the personal-income growth rate actually used is the difference between the personal-income growth rate in the state and the rate in the nation. Table 2 reports an apparently puzzling result: the mean and median growth rates are negative. However, these numbers are weighted by the number of banks in each state. The negative number means that the states with a large number of banks grew more slowly than the rest of the country. 11 The Federal Reserve System has, for several years, used an off-site system that includes a logistic model to forecast bank strength. 14 These models do not produce an unambiguous prediction that a bank will fail; rather, they estimate the probability that a bank will fail. A bank is projected to fail if its 12 In reality, the Call Report data and the examination data are available with a lag, so the data would have been available in early 1992. 13 The December 1986 cross section, for example, used Call Report data from that date as well as data from the last examination before December 1986 and failures from the years 1987 and 1988. Because of the two-year horizon, there is both an "even" and an "odd" version of the pooled model (the former uses Call Report data from even-numbered years, the latter from odd-numbered years). Both forms were tested, and there were no material differences. This paper reports the even version.
14 The terminology of Type I and Type II errors is adopted from hypothesis testing. Simpler criteria for forecasts can be developed. Such criteria, however, would necessarily involve some system of weighting the two types of error. For instance, there are criteria involving rank-order statistics, but these can be interpreted as assigning an equal weight to the two errors. In bank-failure models, Type I errors are usually thought more serious, but there is no general agreement about the appropriate weights. estimated probability exceeds a specific threshold level. Raising the threshold necessarily decreases the number of projected failures. Decreasing the number of projected failures also reduces the number of failures accurately forecasted, as well as the number of surviving banks projected to fail. Thus, a higher threshold increases the level of Type I errors and decreases the level of Type II errors. One can easily graph the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors by varying the threshold.
These graphs can be used to compare the accuracy of various models. More accurate models have a lower level of Type I errors for any given level of Type II errors.
That is, the curve representing a more accurate model lies below and to the left of the curve for a less accurate model; or equivalently, the curve lies closer to the origin (which represents no Type I errors and no Type II errors).
It should be noted that such curves can intersect. In these cases, one model is not unambiguously better than the other.
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These errors can be measured both in-sample and out-of-sample. In-sample graphs use the same data that were used to estimate the model, so they reflect the fit of the data. However, for FDIC purposes, the critical criterion is not statistical fit but forecasting power. Forecasting is by definition out-of-sample, so out-of-sample errors are more relevant to the model's usefulness to the FDIC.
For example, the model was estimated on failures in 1990 and 1991, Call Report data from December 1989, and the CAMEL rating for the last exam before December 15 Actually, bank supervisors are most interested in the section of the curve that represents a low level of Type II errors. Bank supervisors have limited resources to devote to monitoring banks intensively. Failure models and other off-site models can be used to identify those banks that are in the most danger of failing so that supervisors can allocate those resources. Type II errors amount to a waste of resources because supervisory resources are diverted to banks that are not in danger of failure. Because of the constraint, supervisors are undoubtedly most interested in not wasting resources, that is, in low Type II errors. Consequently, they would be most interested in whether, for low levels of Banks with worse CAMEL management and liquidity ratings are also more likely to fail. 17 In addition, banks that have not been examined recently are more likely to fail.
Low income is not a consistently significant indicator of failure, but at least the sign on net income is consistently negative.
The capital, asset, and earnings CAMEL ratings are mostly statistically insignificant, and their coefficients are often the "wrong" sign. One possible explanation is that the capital/asset ratio as well as the loss/reserves ratio conveys the relevant information in the capital rating, whereas the two past-due loan terms are redundant with the asset rating, and the earnings rating adds nothing to the net-income term. There are no variables in this specification that are obvious measures of management quality or liquidity.
The charge-off/bad loans ratio changes sign, and in the pooled model there is a statistically significant relationship between high charge-offs and failure. One could argue either that high charge-offs indicate that the bank has problems in the loan portfolio (and is likely to fail) or that the bank is dealing with the problems in the portfolio (and is likely to survive). The statistical results do not differentiate between these two theories.
Finally, there is an ambiguous but generally statistically significant relationship between a bank's loan growth and its probability of failure. Small variations in loan growth are not economically significant, however, because the coefficients are very small. For example, in the pooled regression, consistent loan growth of 18 percent per year has about the same effect as a 1 percent difference in the capital/asset ratio. This result is not quite universal; there are some specifications in which state data are insignificant in the early 1990s.
The economic data have the expected signs. The negative coefficient on the previous year's personal-income growth means that failure is more likely when the state in which the bank is headquartered is growing less rapidly than the rest of the United
States. The positive coefficient on the growth that occurred between three and five years earlier means that high growth in the past tends to put banks at more risk. The data confirm the impression of a boom/bust pattern to bank failures.
Moreover, the coefficients are economically significant. The effect of a 1 percent decrease in the capital-asset ratio has about the same effect as being located in a state that 18 Mathematically, (-1%) * (-0.373) = 18% * (0.0050 + 0.0079 + 0.0036). This general result is robust across samples and specifications. This does not translate directly into a probability of failure because the logistic is nonlinear. This result might seem to contradict previous research that indicates that high growth is a high-risk strategy, a theory that found its way into the provisions of FDICIA. However, the specification includes past-due loans and is limited to a two-year horizon. Possibly, within two years of failure, the quality of the loan portfolio already reflects the negative effects of high growth. If that is true, then within two years of failure, loans past due (which resulted from rapid past growth) are a better indicator than the growth itself. was growing 1.4 percent more rapidly than the rest of the nation and is now growing 1.4 percent less rapidly. 4 indicates that the state data considerably improve the fit of the model. Though a model with more data necessarily has at least as good a fit as models with less data, the same is not true for forecasting. It is well known among macroeconomic forecasters that more sophisticated models often perform worse than simpler models. While it is possible to find specifications in which state data actually improve forecasts for some periods, we were unable to find a specification in which state data consistently improved forecasts. Indeed, for most specifications, the inclusion of state data actually produced noticeably worse forecasts for some periods. A model that included state data would have misled regulators during some periods.
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Possible Explanations
There are a multitude of possible explanations for these results. First, the specification might be incorrect. All empirical work runs this risk.
Arguably, this project has been more affected by the opposite problem: during the course of this project, numerous specifications were tested with the goal of finding the correct specification. The search was done in terms of both statistical significance and forecasting power. Such searches can easily produce spurious results that owe more to overfitting than to any underlying economic relationship. Consequently, the results of 20 In the section of the graph of most interest to bank regulators, the model with state data does notably worse. figure 2) . However, if supervisors close banks quickly, the lag will be shorter. Banks in Massachusetts failed soon after that state went into recession; figure 3 shows practically no lag. If this is the case, the forecasting model performs poorly because the model is looking for the same lag in Massachusetts that it found in Texas.
Fifth, bank data are economic data. Any reasonable model of bank failure includes a number of variables that reflect the health of the local economy. Loans past due 30-89 days, for example, are procyclical and seem to be roughly contemporaneous.
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Because bank balance sheets reflect local economic conditions, the question is whether other economic data, such as personal-income growth, add anything to that information.
Bank data do have one important advantage in failure models. The bank is affected by the economy in which it does business. And virtually no bank markets coincide with state boundaries. Most banks have only a few branches and do business in a relatively small area, so their health depends less on the condition of the state economy than on whether the local factory shuts down or whether local farmers can survive a drought. On the other hand, some banks lend out-of-state, exposing part of their portfolio to events in other states. 24 Of course, money-center banks do business throughout the world, so the less-developed-country crisis is an inherent part of the history of banks improve the fit in each year. 23 There is a weak relationship (a correlation coefficient of -0.233) between loans past due 30-89 days at banks headquartered in the state and personal-income growth in the state. The relationship is statistically significant and of the same order of magnitude as the correlation of either employment growth or the unemployment rate with personalincome growth. The contemporaneous relationship is strongest, but there are two important caveats. First, the contemporaneous relationship is between past-due loans at the end of the quarter and income growth during the quarter. The timing problem is inherent in any comparison between stocks and flows. Second, the difference between contemporaneous, leading, and lagging correlation coefficients is tiny. The correlation coefficient between income growth and loans past due at the end of the previous quarter is -0.216, and between income growth and loans past due at the end of next quarter, -0.211.
As one might expect, there is a lagging relationship with loans past due 90+ days and income growth. Credit card banks are omitted from this analysis. 24 Banks lent far from the home state even before interstate banking. during the 1980s. Currently, the federal agencies do know where banks have branches and how much money has been deposited in those branches. However, even if these data were completely accurate (and they are probably not), the major risk to banks is loans, not deposits. Given these problems, it is virtually impossible to measure economic conditions accurately within a bank's market.
The bank's balance sheet, however, indicates economic conditions precisely within the bank's market. Of course, that information is noisy because the quality of the management and other factors affect the balance sheet. Arguably, this is an advantage, for the question is not the health of the economy where the bank does business but how the economy affects the bank. That effect depends heavily on the quality of management.
Hence, state economic data might add little to forecasting models because they do not add any information to the data already in the model. It must be stressed that these explanations are conjectural. Some are logically impossible to verify (for example, logically one can never show that there is no additional information in data). Moreover, the proposed reasons are undoubtedly incomplete.
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Though the reasons for our failure to find an effect are not obvious, it is obvious that we did not find a way to use state economic data to improve forecasts of bank failure. Five years of data were used. All variables were run both as levels and as differences from the comparable U.S. value. All variables were run both as levels and as differences from the comparable U.S. value. All dollar values were deflated by the GDP deflator. Total loans and assets are from the December Call Report. Thrifts and credit card banks were excluded. Notes: For each variable, the coefficient is in the first line. The standard error of the coefficient is in the second line. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. The Call Report variables are as of the end of the year, and the examination variables are for the last exam before the end of the year. Failures occurred within two years of the Call Report. Notes: For each variable, the coefficient is in the first line. The standard error of the coefficient is in the second line. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. The Call Report variables are as of the end of the year, and the examination variables are for the last exam before the end of the year. Failures occurred within two years of the Call Report. In-Sample Fit Failures in 1990 and 1991 30 Out-of-Sample Forecasts
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